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Every day the purchasing departments1 of public institutions of 
higher learning2 procure goods and services from vendors3 to meet the 
universities’ needs. Everything from software to office supplies, guest 
speakers to insurance, is procured for the benefit of the institution’s staff, 
students, and guests.4 Unlike private institutions, public institutions face 
unique state constitutional and statutory requirements, in addition to state and 
federal regulations.5 These requirements create a host of legal challenges for 
public institutions in how they structure their procurement process and 
contractually enter into agreements with vendors.6 The cumulative result of 
these issues can be a headache for both the purchasing departments and the 
private vendors that service them.
                                                     
1 Purchasing departments are also referred to as “procurement offices.” 
2 Public institutions of higher learning are institutions created by state statute. They 
include: state colleges, state universities and community colleges. 
3 Vendors are also referred to as “contractors.” Vendors can be any company that 
provides goods or services to a public institution of higher learning regardless of 
whether vendors specialize in serving public intuitions or selling their goods or 
services to the public at large.   
4 The Univ. of Texas at Austin, Contracts Transparency Report,
https://purchasing.utexas.edu/resources/purchase-and-contract-transparency-
report/contracts (last visited May 13, 2017); Daniel Hurley, Doreen Murner & 
Alene Russel, Public College & University Procurement A Survey of the State 
Regulatory Environment, Institutional Procurement Practices and Efforts Toward 
Cost Containment, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF STATE COLLEGES AND 




5 Daniel Hurley, Doreen Murner & Alene Russel, at 20.
6 Id. at 18-19; Cory Harms, Paula DeAngelo, Jim Twetten & Jason Ferguson, Are 
You Clicking Your Life Away?, EDU. PROCUREMENT J. 16, 20 (2014). 
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One problem both parties face is mutual agreement on 
indemnification or hold harmless7 provisions.8 Many public universities and 
colleges are generally prohibited from entering into indemnification 
provisions by anti-deficiency laws and/or because of state sovereign 
immunities. Procurement contracts with public institutions of higher learning 
can contain express provisions stating their unwillingness or inability to 
indemnify vendors.9 Contracts can also remain silent regarding the vendors’ 
indemnification rights.10 Furthermore, purchasing departments or the 
university’s counsel often edit or completely remove indemnification 
provisions from a vendor’s terms and conditions – even when the terms are 
fair to both parties.11 As a result, these regulations create a challenge for 
vendors who may rightfully expect to be fully protected from third party 
lawsuits or harm that may occur as a result of doing business with public 
institutions of higher learning. 
This paper will examine the indemnification issues that arise when 
vendors and public institutions of higher learning contract. First, this paper 
will examine what indemnification provisions are and what function they 
serve in the agreements. Second, it will examine why public institutions of 
higher learning are generally prohibited and/or limited when offering 
indemnification based on the interplay of state constitutions, statutes and 
jurisprudence regarding: anti-deficiency laws, tort claims acts, state 
sovereign immunity and the sovereign privilege of nullum tempus. Third, in 
light of these legal hurdles, we will then analyze survey responses from 
public institutions of higher learning on how they address indemnification 
provisions in light of the legal restrictions placed upon them. Finally, this 
paper will recommend that vendors to public universities find alternative 
means of protecting themselves from liabilities incurred as a result of doing 
business with public institutions of higher learning, because indemnification 
agreements, even when agreed to, may not be actionable in a court of law. 
                                                     
7 Although indemnification provisions and hold harmless provisions are legally 
distinguishable, this note treats them similarly for indemnification purposes based 
on their potential to be temporally and monetarily indeterminate. 
8 See infra Table 1, Q2.
9 Clemson Univ., Clemson University Standard Terms and Conditions – Revision 
C, at 5 (2015), http://www.clemson.edu/procurement/documents/vendors/Bidding-
Termsconditions.pdf.; West Virginia Univ., West Virginia University and Its 
Affiliates Purchase Order Terms and Conditions, at 1, 
http://procurement.wvu.edu/files/d/d5154c67-9435-4dca-ac0a-5f9776f47f4f/po-
terms-conditons-02_16_16.pdf.
10 Ohio State Purchasing Dep’t, OSU-Purchasing Department-Standard Purchase 
Order Terms and Conditions, at 5 (2016), 
http://purchasing.osu.edu/FileStore/PDFs/OSU_TermsAndConditions.pdf.
11 See infra Table 1, Q11. 
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II. HURDLES TO INDEMNIFICATION
A. Contractual Indemnification Generally and Indeterminate Liability
Indemnification or hold harmless provisions are among the most 
fought over provisions in contracts with public universities of higher 
learning.12 Indemnification is defined generally as “[t]he action of 
compensating for loss or damage sustained.”13 Thus, an indemnification 
provision between two parties requires the “party breaching its 
representations or covenants . . . to indemnify the other party for all costs, 
damages, and losses incurred as a result of breach.”14 This act of 
compensation for the loss or damage of one party to an agreement by another 
party creates an indemnitor-indemnitee relationship. For example, a “[p]atent 
licensee requires that a [s]tate university indemnify it for any infringement 
claims arising from the use of the patented technology.”15 This hypothetical 
example from the Ohio Attorney General demonstrates a contractual 
indemnification provision where the patent licensee (the indemnitee) expects 
to be indemnified by a state university (the indemnitor) in a suit by a third 
party such as the patent holder. This indemnification provision is reasonable 
in the event the state university, its faculty, guests or students violate the 
patent license, giving rise to an infringement lawsuit against the patent 
licensee.16
Furthermore, the above indemnification provision between a patent 
licensee and a state university creates a “contingent liability that is temporally 
and monetarily indeterminate.”17 That is, there is no limit (“cap”) on the 
monetary amount an indemnitee can recover for damages or a limitation on 
the amount of time in which an indemnitee may bring a claim for recovery. 
Indefinite monetary and temporal indemnification provisions are prominent 
factors preventing public institutions of higher learning from accepting 
indemnification agreements because they create a contingent liability.18
                                                     
12 See infra Table 1, Q10.
13 Indemnification, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014).
14 CHARLES M. FOX, WORKING WITH CONTRACTS: WHAT LAW SCHOOL DOESN’T
TEACH YOU 27 (2d ed. 2008).
15 ESSENTIAL TERMS,
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Business/Commercialization/Essential-
Terms#ohioLaw (last visited Sept. 26, 2016). 
16 See generally Id. (cited for the idea that a lawsuit can be brought against the 
patent licensee). 
17 Id.
18 ESSENTIAL TERMS, supra note 15; Ohio Att’y. Gen. Op. No. 96-060 at 3 (1996); 
See discussion infra Section II.b.3, III.b.1 (discussing ways of capping 
indemnification provisions to comply with a state’s law).
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Indemnification provisions can have caps and carve-outs 
(“exceptions”) that limit the extent and scope of an indeterminate 
indemnification provision.19 For example, “[p]atent licensee requires that a 
[s]tate university indemnify it for any infringement claims arising from the 
use of the patented technology [up to 1 million dollars and for a period of 2 
years].”20 The added language places a monetary cap of one million dollars 
for patent infringement and a temporal limit of two years. Therefore, 
indemnification provisions in contracts generally may be capped in order to 
prevent an indemnification provision from creating a contingent liability.21
For practical purposes, contracts used by vendors and public 
institutions of higher learning tend to have indefinite monetary and temporal 
indemnification provisions like Google’s terms of service.22 This is because 
they provide blanket protection in agreements whose terms are not usually 
negotiated between the parties and are used in multiple transactions with 
various parties. For example, Google’s Terms of Service (synonymous with 
“Terms & Conditions”) contains “Click-wrap,” which is a general contract 
that millions of people agree to when they sign-up to use Google’s free 
services.23 This general agreement is convenient for both Google and its 
customers because it allows millions of transactions to occur in a fast and 
convenient manner. When an employee of a public institution of higher 
learning signs up for Google’s free services in their official capacity, the 
employee may be entering into an agreement with an indemnification 
provision that the public institution is prohibited from entering into under 
state law.24 This is a problem for public universities who are subject to state 
limitations despite the convenience indeterminate clauses may afford 
vendors and employees serving in their official capacity.25
On the other hand, public institutions of higher learning can create 
an issue for vendors when the institution’s  contract is mute regarding the 
university’s duty to indemnify the vendor.26 In some instances, public 
institutions will directly cite the laws that prevent the institution from 
                                                     
19 Fox, supra note 14, at 27.
20 ESSENTIAL TERMS, supra note 15 (adding temporal and monetary caps to the 
Ohio Attorney General’s hypothetical example to illustrate caps on 
indemnification).
21 Fox, supra note 14, at 27.
22 TERMS OF SERVICE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2017).
23 Id.
24 ESSENTIAL TERMS, supra note 15 (for further discussions of the issue).
25 Harms, DeAngelo, Twetten & Ferguson, supra note 4, at 20. 
26 Univ. of Washington, University of Washington General Terms and Conditions,
4 (2015), https://f2.washington.edu/fm/ps/sites/default/files/purchasing/terms-and-
conditions/UWTermsandConditions10.2.15.pdf.
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indemnifying vendors in the contract.27 Vendors are also informed about the 
institution’s lack of ability to indemnify them through the contract editing 
process known as redlining.28 Public institutions of higher learning may also 
provide memorandums outlining their indemnification policy online or are 
able to provide them upon request.29 Irrespective of how public institutions 
inform vendors to their inability to indemnify them, many vendors are 
generally left without indemnification protection and an understanding as to 
what limit of protection they may be entitled to under a particular state’s Tort 
Reform Act and applicable case law.   
B. Arm of the state: State Sovereign Immunity, Rights of the State and 
Restrictions  
Understanding what indemnification is, public institutions of higher 
learning are unable to agree to indemnification provisions based on their 
status as an arm of the state which: (1) clothes them in state sovereign 
immunity that is narrowly relinquished under state Tort Reform Acts; (2) 
endows them with the sovereign power of nullum tempus that enables public 
institution to bring a suit in the absence of a statute of limitations against the 
state; and (3) anti-deficiency laws that prevent state arms from entering into 
agreements without the appropriation of funds.30
1. State Sovereign Immunity  
Because the Eleventh Amendment clothes an arm of the state in state 
sovereign immunity, the arm is immune from suit for monetary damages 
unless it has expressly accented to suit in statute.31 State sovereign immunity 
is derived from the common law which protects the state or state entity with 
                                                     
27 Univ. of Mississippi, University of Mississippi Terms and Conditions, 2, 
http://procurement.olemiss.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/55/2014/08/Purchasing_Terms_and_Conditions.pdf, at 2 (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2017); West Virginia Univ., supra note 9, at 1.  
28 See infra Table 1, Q11.
29 Memorandum from Office of University Counsel, University of New Mexico 
(Apr. 7, 2006) (on file with Ohio State Business Law Journal) (demonstrating
indemnification memorandum available online); Memorandum Regarding 
Indemnification & Choice of Law, Ohio State Purchasing Dep’t (demonstrating 
indemnification memorandum made available by the university upon request). 
30 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (citing Poindexter 
v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 287 (1885)); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 487 (1887); 
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 438-439, (1887); Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of 
Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Clissuras v. City of Uni. of N.Y., 359 
F.3d 79 (2nd Cir. 2004); Irizarry-Mora v. Uni. of P.R., 647 F.3d 9, (2011)); Raj v. 
La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 329 (5th Cir. 2013); Ariz. Students’ Ass’n. v. Ariz. 
Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2016).
31 Hans v. La., 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890). 
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“armor” against suit.32 The theory incorporates the belief that the “the King 
can do no wrong” and thus cannot be sued without consent.33 The Supreme 
Court abrogated the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Chisholm v. Georgia
in 1793.34 However, Congress responded quickly to the Supreme Court’s 
decision by passing the Eleventh Amendment in 1794 as a means of 
protecting states from suit without their consent. The Eleventh Amendment 
was facially interpreted as protecting states from suits by citizens of foreign 
states, but extended to include the state’s citizens after Hans v. Louisiana.35
Understanding this history, state colleges and public universities 
have been defined as “arms of the state” with few exceptions. An arm of the 
state is “an entity created by a state [that] operat[es] as an alter ego or 
instrumentality of the state, such as a state university . . . .”36 Historical and 
statutory names for an arm of the state include “state instrumentality,” 
“governmental entity” and “state agency.”37 State colleges and public 
universities are often directly defined under the arms of the state category in 
state statute.38
In contrast, divisions of the state often considered by the public as a 
state entity do not receive state sovereign immunity.39 These entities included 
cities and school districts that are classified as political subdivisions for 
federal court purposes.40 This classification largely derives from the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Mt. Healthy School District that political subdivisions are 
not granted state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.41 In 
Mt. Healthy School District, the Court based its ruling on a two factor test 
that focused on (a) the state’s characterization of the political subdivision in 
state statute and (b) the ability of the political subdivision to raise its own 
funds.42 Because Ohio did not classify school districts as arms of the state 
                                                     
32 240 Wyo. Op. Att’y. Gen. 5 (1979).
33 Id.  
34 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, at 478 (1793). 
35 Scott Dodson, The Metes and Bounds of State Sovereign Immunity, 29 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 721, 733-735 (2002). 
36 Arm of the State, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
37 OHIO REV. CODE §123.10(C) (2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-30 (d)-(e) (2008); 
V.T.C.A., GOV. CODE §468.001 (2001). 
38 Id. 
39 Alex E. Rogers, Clothing State Government Entities with Sovereign Immunity: 
Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L.
REV. 1243, 1246 (1992).
40 Id. 
41 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977). 
42 Rogers, supra note 34, at 1244. See also 1 Cyc. of Fed. Proc. § 2:68, Immunity of 
State agency as arm or alter ego of state, (3rd ed. 2016) (There is no single test or 
set of factors that determines how to dissolve an arm of the state of its sovereign 
immunity).
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and the school district had the ability to raise funds through bond measures, 
it was not considered an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment immunity 
purposes. In light of the Court’s ruling, states like Colorado enacted statutes 
that defined school districts and cities as arms of the state.43 These statutory 
classifications clothed state subdivisions with state sovereign immunity 
protection from law suits brought under state law only.44
One example where a public institution of higher learning was 
successfully stripped of its sovereign immunity centered on the state’s 
categorization of the public institution in a state statute, or lack thereof. In 
Soni, a former employee of the University of Tennessee sued the 
University.45 Focusing on part “a” of the Mt. Healthy School District test, the 
Sixth Circuit determined that the University’s creation was not expressly 
authorized by statute and therefore not exempt from suit by state sovereign 
immunity.46 The Tennessee legislature responded to the Sixth Circuit’s ruling 
by passing Tennessee Code § 20-13-102(b). This statute expressly authorized 
the university’s creation and clothed it in sovereign immunity.47
Although courts unanimously agree that a state statute must 
authorize the creation of an arm of the state to receive state sovereign 
immunity, there remains a lack of consensus regarding other pertinent 
factors. For this reason, the test for determining whether a state arm is 
protected by the Eleventh Amendment was not settled by the Court’s ruling 
in Mt. Healthy School District and its complexity has grown with subsequent 
Court rulings at both the state and federal levels. The most recent Supreme 
Court precedent on the issue in Regents of the University of California v. Doe
did little to provide clear guidelines. The suit was brought against the 
University of California (“University”) by a prospective employee and New 
York resident.48 The University operated a laboratory in accordance with a 
federal Department of Energy contract that indemnified the University 
against litigation, which included adverse judgments.49 When the prospective 
employee was unable to obtain a security clearance, the prospective 
employee sued for breach-of-contract contending that the “Laboratory 
wrongfully refused to perform the contract of employment by peremptorily 
determining that [he] could not obtain a security clearance from the 
                                                     
43 Deb Asimus & Michelle Reese, Clarifying the Boundaries of Eleventh 
Amendment Immunity, 27 COLO. LAW. 51 (1998).
44 Id.
45 Soni v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Tenn., 513 F.2d 347, 347-48 (6th Cir. 1975).
46 Id. at 352-53. 
47 See generally Univ. of Tenn. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 670 F. Supp. 1379, 
1380 (E.D. Tenn. 1987); Gross v. Univ. of Tenn., 448 F. Supp. 245, 247-248 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1978); Woolsey v. Hunt, 932 F.2d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 1991).
48 Regents, 519 U.S. at 426. 
49 Id. at 426-27. 
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Department [of Energy].”50 The District Court ruled in favor of the 
University, holding that it was “an arm of the state” for Eleventh Amendment 
purposes.51
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s 
decision and ruled in favor of the prospective employee. The court used a 
five-factor test in their analysis to consider the University’s source of 
funding.52 The factors were: 
[1] whether a money judgment would be satisfied out of state 
funds, [2] whether the entity performs central governmental 
functions, [3] whether the entity may sue or be sued, [4] 
whether the entity has power to take property in its own 
name or only the name of the state, and [5] the corporate 
status of the entity.53
The Ninth Circuit considered the State of California’s liability for 
money judgment as “the single most important factor in determining whether 
an entity is an arm of the state.”54 For this reason, the court found the first 
factor in favor of the prospective employee because the University was 
indemnified by the Department of Energy and the State of California was not 
responsible for the payment of funds.55 The Ninth Circuit found that the 
University served a central government function and held the second factor 
in favor of the University. The University based this decision on the fact that 
there was ample case precedent determining: that the University was an arm 
of the state; a California Attorney General Opinion confirming that the 
University was an arm of the state; and a state statute defining the University 
as an arm of the state in the performance of a “central government 
function.”56 The third factor weighed against the University because the 
California Constitution Article 9 § 9(f) granted the University “the power to 
sue and be sued” in accordance with factor three.57
Furthermore, the fourth and fifth factors were found in favor of the 
perspective employee. The Fourth factor went against the University because 
the University possessed the power to take property in the name of the 
Regents of California.58 In the Ninth Circuits eyes the fifth factor weighed 
heavily against the University because the state’s constitution established the 
                                                     
50 Doe v. Livermore Nat’l. Lab., 65 F.3d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1995).
51 Doe v. Livermore Nat’l. Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997).





57 Doe, 65 F.3d at 775.
58 Id.
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University as a “corporation known as ‘The Regents of the University of 
California.’”59 Thus, the application of the five-factor test led the Circuit 
court to conclude that the University was not “entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity for all of its functions.”60
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision, siding with the lower court’s dissenting opinion.61 The 
Court held that divesting an arm of the state of sovereign immunity is not 
based on “who pays in the end; it is who is legally obligated to pay the 
judgment that is being sought.”62 That is, the Court disagreed with the Ninth 
Circuit because the Court viewed the “entity’s potential legal liability” as 
“relevant” to whether the Eleventh Amendment should apply and not “its 
ability or inability to require a third party to reimburse it.”63 Thus, in 
determining that the State of California did not waive its right to sovereign 
immunity the  Court only considered the first two factors as relevant and 
disregarded the last three. 
Since Hans v. Louisiana, the federal and state governments remained 
largely immune from suit until Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(“TCA”) in 1946.64 The statute expressly accented to suits against the federal 
government by private individuals for tort and contract claims.65 The states 
soon followed Congress’s example by passing TCAs or State Claims Acts 
(“SCA”). STCs are also known as Government Claims Acts or Board of 
Claims Acts.66 TCA and STCs are similar in that that a number of them have 
placed caps and limitations that mitigate and/or continue to protect states 
from suit.67 In fact, 33 states cap damages that may be awarded against the 
state “and at least 29 states prohibit a judgment against the state from 
including punitive or exemplary damages.”68 However, the fact that TCAs 
                                                     
59 Id. (citing CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9, subsec. a). 
60 Id. 
61 Regents, 519 U.S. at 432. 
62 Id. at 428, 431 (citing Doe, 65 F.3d 771).
63 Id. at 431.
64 National Conferences of State Legislatures, State Sovereign Immunity and Tort 
Liability Act, (last visited Apr., 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/state-sovereign-immunity-and-tort-
liability.aspx; 28 U.S.C §2674.
65 Id.
66 LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5101 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.072 (West 2017).
67 Jaime Rall, Weather or Not? State Liability And Road Weather Information 
Systems, NATIONAL CONFERENCES OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2010) (50 state 




68 Id. at 22, 50.  
96 OHIO STATE BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 11.1
and STAs were enacted does not necessarily prevent states from raising 
immunity from suit as demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Regents of California v. Doe.69 This is because the TCA or STA in general 
must expressly state the types of suits that may be brought against the state.70
2. Nullum Tempus 
If sovereign immunity acts as the armor of the state, then the doctrine 
of nullum tempus acts as the sword. Viewed as “opposite sides of the same 
coin” as sovereign immunity, nullum tempus enables an arm of the state to 
bring a suit against a party irrespective of express statutory or contractual 
limitations on time.71 Moreover, the “historical and doctrinal underpinnings” 
of the two doctrines has led some courts to treat the two doctrines similarly 
from a policy standpoint.72 That is, both doctrines protect “public fisc by 
allowing the government to pursue wrongdoers in vindication of public rights 
and property without regard to the time limitations applicable to other 
parties.”73 The specific policy reason upholding nullum tempus focuses on 
the state’s ability to bring suits against tortious actors in order to exact justice 
while protecting the state’s finances.74 For example, a suit against a private 
actor for industrial pollution should not bar a sovereign state from seeking 
redress when the statute applies to private citizens. Statutes of limitations or 
repose therefore do not bar states from seeking redress unless specifically 
assented to in statute.75
The doctrine of nullum tempus is illustrated in State v. Lombardo 
Brothers.76 A contract dispute arose between the University of Connecticut 
School of Law (“University”) and the contractor, the defendants.77 The
defendants were tasked with constructing a library that would last 100 
years.78 However, the building was negligently constructed and required the 
University to spend over $15 million in corrective work.79 The University 
sued the defendants for the cost of the work, but the defendants challenged 
the assumption that the doctrine of nullum tempus was adopted from the 
common law.80 In addition, the defendants argued that the state’s chief 
                                                     
69 See generally Regents, 519 U.S. 425. 
7057 Am. Jur. 2d Municipal, etc., Tort Liability § 1.  
71 Conn. v. Lombardo Bros. Mason Contractors, Inc., 307 Conn. 412, at 430, 437-
41 (2012). 
72Id. at 437.
73 Id. at 437 (quoting Pamela v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 328, (1998)). 
74 Id. at 430-31.
75 Lombardo Bros. Mason Contractors, Inc., 307 Conn. at 438-439.  
76 See generally, Id.
77 Id. at 421. 
78 Id. at 420. 
79 Id. at 421. 
80 Lombardo Bros. Mason Contractors, Inc., 307 Conn. at 422. 
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deputy commissioner of public works (“commissioner”) waived the state’s 
ability to raise nullum tempus in contract and agreed to be bound by the 
state’s statute of repose.81 The trial court held in favor of the defendants 
holding that the state never adopted the doctrine of nullum tempus directly 
from the common law.82
The Connecticut Supreme Court (“the court”) overruled the trial 
court’s decision holding that the doctrine of nullum tempus was a 
longstanding doctrine accepted by the courts of Connecticut at both common 
law and longstanding acceptance in case law.83 More pertinent to our 
discussion, the court then rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
commissioner waived the state’s right of nullum tempus by signing the 
contract.84 Even though the commissioner was authorized by state statute to 
enter into contracts on behalf of the University, he was not authorized 
“expressly or by force of necessary implication” to waive the state’s right of 
nullum tempus.85 That is, only an express mandate in statute can authorize 
the commissioner to waive the right of nullum tempus.86
The above point is an important one for vendors seeking to do 
business with public institutions of higher learning. Even though an 
indemnity provision may limit the institution’s ability to bring such a claim 
within a specified period of time, the agreed upon clause may be 
unenforceable because the authorized representative does not have the 
statutory authority to waive the state’s right to bring a claim. A university 
representative therefore cannot waive statutory requirements placed on the 
university in statute that is based in the state’s constitution or statue. 
Therefore, a representative authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of the 
state cannot waive state sovereign immunity unless expressly authorized to 
do so in statute. 
If we apply the above information to our above patent licensee 
example, we obtain a similar result. Assume that our fictitious state university 
enters into an indemnification agreement with the patent licensee that 
requires both parties to indemnify each other up to two years, and there is no 
statute or constitutional provision expressly limiting the time frame the state 
can bring a suit. With these conditions, we can assume that the state may 
bring a suit against the patent licensee. Under the common law, the state 
retains the right of nullum tempus unless the doctrine was abolished by case 
law. The contractual provision of repose barring the state from bringing an 
indemnification claim is therefore unenforceable. 
                                                     
81 Id. at 419.
82 Id. at 418-419. 
83 Id. at 426. 
84 Id. at 420. 
85 Lombardo Bros. Mason Contractors, Inc., 307 Conn. at 457-59.
86 Id. at 420
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3. Anti-Deficiency Provisions in State Constitutions and 
Statutes 
The final hurdle for public institutions of higher learning entering 
into indemnification provisions are anti-deficiency provisions embodied in 
state constitutions and statutes.87 Anti-deficiency provisions in state 
constitutions and statutes prohibit, or limit, arms of the state from entering 
into agreements that would require the state to take on an unspecified amount 
of debt.88 Anti-deficiency provisions act as a shield for the public fisc by 
nullifying contracts  in violation  of such provisions.89 While the origin 
behind these provisions are a product of history, the fiscal policy behind 
controlling excessive government spending remains the same today as it was 
at the time of their enactment.90
In the mid-to-late 1800s many states faced fiscal problems brought 
on by massive spending on government financed railroads and canals.91 For
example, the state of New York led the way in massive debt expenditures for 
financing the construction of canals in the belief that adequate revenue would 
flow in from their construction to finance them.92 The anticipated revenue 
did not materialize.93 By 1842 New York was out of money and state debt 
reached $20 million which was exacerbated by a depression in 1837.94 To 
address deficit spending New York enacted constitutional debt limitations in 
1846.95 No state constitution contained anti-deficiency limitations in their 
constitution prior to 1840.96 By 1855 nineteen states enacted anti-deficiency 
limitations in their state constitutions.97 Moreover, the proliferation of anti-
deficiency limitations in state constitutions continued after the civil war.98
Southern states faced high deficits due to corruption and government 
spending run amuck.99
Anti-deficiency limitations were effective in reigning in state debt, 
but made it difficult for states to raise funds for public projects and enter into 
                                                     
87 See, e.g., infra Appendix (for a partial list of the 50 state anti-deficiency laws). 
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certain contractual agreements. Today, “[m]ore than three-quarters of the 
states retain debt limitations in their current constitutions.”100 These 
constitutional provisions can be broken down into 6 groups. For example: 
A handful of constitutions prohibit state debt altogether. 
About a dozen states limit state debt to a maximum amount, 
measured either in dollars, or in percentage of state 
revenues, or in percentage of assessed value. A few states set 
a maximum amount, but require a public referendum or 
legislative supermajority even for debt that does not exceed 
the maximum. Another group of states permits unlimited 
debt, but only if the debt is approved by public referendum. 
A few states permit unlimited debt without referendum if 
approved by a legislative supermajority. Finally, still 
another group requires both a legislative supermajority and
approval by public referendum. 101
In light of these limitations, most state courts use “escape devices” such as 
the public authority doctrine, to circumvent the various anti-deficiency 
limitations placed on these different groups which are fact and court 
specific.102
Pertinent to our understanding of indemnification provisions 
between vendors and public institutions of higher learning is the dichotomy 
between the states of New Jersey and Ohio, and the middle ground between 
the two states. The difference between these three groupings sheds light on 
why some public institutions of higher learning are able to indemnify vendors 
while others are not. Both New Jersey and Ohio have anti-deficiency 
limitations in their state constitutions that limit the amount of debt the state 
can take on.103 Per Ohio’s constitution, the state cannot take on debt in excess 
of $750,000 that is not expressly authorized by the state constitution.104 New 
Jersey on the other hand is limited to taking on debt in excess of 1% of the 
state’s budget without a referendum.105
The major divergence between these two states is in their respective 
case law. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has effectively “eviscerated the 
debt limitations principally through liberal use of the public authorities 
doctrine.”106 States that do not have anti-indemnity limitations or case law 
that renders the state’s anti-indemnity limitations superfluous create fewer 
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barriers for public institutions of higher learning to indemnify vendors. In 
sharp contrast Ohio jurisprudence has firmly upheld Ohio’s anti-indemnity 
limitations since the seminal case State v. Medbery.107
Medbery sued the state of Ohio over a contract with the Board of 
Public Works that was to be paid in 5 yearly installments totaling 
$1,375,000.108 The Supreme Court of Ohio invalidated the agreement based 
on the anti-deficiency limitations in the Ohio Constitution.109 The 
constitutional provisions separately prohibited debt over $750,000 and all 
other debt not expressly authorized in section 2 related to bonds.110 By not 
using an escape device like the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Ohio 
Supreme court came to another conclusion. The court held that if a state 
agency incurs a liability, direct or contingent, in the absence of an expressed 
appropriation to pay such liability, debt is created.111 That is, the state of Ohio 
is prohibited from taking on unspecified debts that are monetarily and 
temporally indefinite because they violate the biennium’s appropriation of 
state funds. Ohio courts have distilled this reasoning into a two-part test that 
requires a contract to: (1) make appropriations made and revenue provided 
for each two-year obligation and (2) limit each agreement to not to exceed 
two years.112
Ohio is not alone in its interpretation. Other states also view anti-
deficiency limitations as prohibiting state arms from entering agreements 
when funding is not appropriated.113 States subject to strict adherence to anti-
deficiency limitations such as Ohio, cannot be contractually required to be a 
party to contract that goes beyond the state’s periodic114 appropriation of 
funds.115 Understanding this, indemnification provisions in contracts 
between institutions of higher learning and vendors are permissible so long 
as the amount being indemnified for is specified and the institution is not 
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required to indemnify the vendor beyond the state’s periodic appropriation 
of funds. Changing our above Patent licensee example to Ohio State 
demonstrates that it is possible for states with anti-deficiency limitations to 
indemnify vendors, subject to limitations. Ohio State can theoretically 
indemnify our hypothetical Patent licensee as long as the indemnification 
amount is capped and the university’s obligation does not exceed the state 
biennium of two years. 
C. Summary of State Sovereign Immunity and Rights of the State
Unfortunately, the diversity of jurisdictions in a federal legal system 
make it difficult for interstate companies to draft general indemnification and 
hold harmless agreements that are enforceable in every jurisdiction. Standard 
indemnification practices in one state may be entirely unacceptable in 
another. General government indemnification provisions should therefore 
take into consideration the possible interplay of state statute, constitutional 
articles and case precedent regarding state sovereign immunity, nullum 
tempus and anti-deficiency limitations. These three state rights act as armor, 
sword and shield by which a court may sever an agreement between a vendor 
and a public institution of higher learning. As a general rule of thumb, only 
the absence of express statutory waiver of a state’s right or the presence of 
long standing case precedent may render an arm of the state compliant with 
an indemnification provision. Vendors therefore may wish to seek alternative 
means in order to ensure that they may be indemnified by the state discussed 
in Section IV.  
III. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Description of Survey and Responses
The 50 state survey was conducted by sending surveys out to 
purchasing departments and general counsels of public institutions of higher 
learning. The overall goal of the survey was to obtain a general overview of 
how public institutions of higher learning realistically deal with vendor 
indemnification and hold harmless agreements in light of the statutory and 
constitutional restrictions discussed in Section I and Section II. Not every 
state is represented in this voluntary 50 state survey. Moreover, not every 
state that responded completed the survey. The data therefore provides a 
rough overview of how public institutions of higher learning respond to 
vendor agreements.
Respondents in every state were sent an anonymous 13 question 
Qualtrics survey via an emailed link. The target respondents were composed 
of university counsel and university purchasing departments. Both university 
counsel and purchasing departments could respond. In addition, responses 
from other university departments were solicited to respond if familiar with 
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indemnification provisions in vendor contracts with the university. Over 50% 
of respondents were from university legal counsel with 42.11% of 
respondents from university purchasing departments. Only 5.26% of 
respondents were from neither department.116
The survey then shifted to information regarding indemnification 
provisions. A whopping 73.68% of respondents indicated that 
indemnification clauses were highly contested between universities and 
vendors.117 Only 21.4% of respondents indicated that indemnification 
provisions were not highly contested.118 When asked if their university was 
prohibited by state law from indemnifying other parties, approximately 
68.42% of respondents stated that they were prohibited by state law from 
indemnifying other parties while 31.58% were not prohibited from 
indemnifying other parties.119 “Yes” responses to legal prohibitions against 
indemnification were asked to provide specific constitutional sections, 
statutes, attorney general opinions and/or case law that prohibited the 
institution from indemnifying another party.120 Answers from these 
respondents were added to  the table in the Appendix. 
B. Alternative Indemnification Approaches
1. Narrowly Tailored Indemnification Provision
Question 11 and Question 5 provided a glimpse of contract redlining 
undertaken by universities to make vendor agreements comply with state 
law. At 46.15%, the majority of respondents indicated that they initially 
strike indemnification provisions.121 This type of edit is problematic for 
vendors. By eliminating an indemnification provision the contract remains 
mute or silent on the issue. In its absence, courts may fill the gap with 
standard case law or other statutory/constitutional requirements. This silence 
puts vendors at a further disadvantage because arms of the state receives 
sovereign rights such as state sovereign immunity, nullum tempus and are 
protected by anti-deficiency laws. Tied for second and third place with 
23.08% is the addition of the phrase “to the extent permitted by law” or a 
“negligent acts or omissions clause.”122 These additions also place vendors 
at risk, especially in a jurisdiction like Ohio which severely limits the state’s 
ability to indemnify vendors. Moreover, negligent acts or omissions clauses 
only state that each party to the agreement is responsible for their own 
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“negligent acts or omissions.”123 The phrase provides little protection from 
third parties. In conjunction with Question 5 many universities explicitly 
stated that they modify indemnification provisions to state “to the extent 
provided by law.”124 One exception however noted that they do not use the 
word “extent” as their jurisdiction does not place a limit on the phrase.125 One 
response to Question 5 indicated that insurance was another tool used in 
conjunction with indemnity. The specific language provided that: “[t]he 
University agrees, to the extent of its obligations and abilities under [state’s] 
law and its insurance applicable to this agreement, to indemnify . . . .” Lastly, 
a minority of respondents at 7.69% chose other.126
The survey further indicates that over 66.7% of jurisdictions are 
willing to narrowly tailor indemnification requirements to comply with their 
state law.127 In states like Ohio that require indemnification amounts to be 
specified and indemnification periods to not to exceed 2 years may provide 
little protection for vendors depending on the type of product being used. In 
contrast, certain products with short life expectancy may only require a short 
two-year indemnification period. Vendors that do frequent business with 
universities under similar law may wish to narrowly tailor their contracts in 
these situations. A narrowly tailored indemnification provisions can provide 
protection for both parties and are preferable to agreements that are silent on 
indemnification rights.128 Narrowly tailored indemnification provisions also 
provide more protection than agreements with the phrase “to the extent 
permitted by law.”129 If the indemnification provision does not meet the 
required state standard, then it may be as ineffective as a contract that is silent 
on the issue in a given jurisdiction.
2. Principal-agent 
Lastly, the survey indicates that about 33.33% of universities are 
willing to use a principal-agent relationship to circumvent laws against 
indemnification.130 A principal-agent is a contractual relationship – although 
not exclusively – whereby the agent acts on behalf of the principal.131 In the 
event that the vendor requires indemnification for breach of the agreement, 
the vendor will be paid by the agent and not the principal.132 The more risk 
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involved in an indemnification provision results in a higher cost for the 
principal-agent relationship.133 However, public universities have a unique 
advantage over other arms of the state through the amicable bonds formed 
with their alumni. Alumni associations for example have been used as agents 
on behalf of the university. Vendors may be able to exploit the willingness 
of alumni associations and other university affiliated organizations as a 
means of acting as agents on behalf of public universities for indemnification 
purposes. This may be especially true in agreements where the university is 
buying a good or service that impacts or is used by the alumni association. 
The survey also indicates that principal-agent relationships are used in about 
less than 1% of total contracts between vendors and universities.134 Never the 
less, principal-agent relationships may prove to be a promising tool for 
expensive contracts.  
3. Liability Insurance
Lastly, survey results have also indicated that vendors should seek 
to protect themselves from losses by requiring universities to provide liability 
insurance or name the vendor as an ensured.135 Vendors can require some 
public universities to insure them from the negligent acts or omissions of the 
university.136 However, certificates of insurance typically may be used to 
cover the university’s negligent acts or omissions and not third party 
claims.137 Universities may also be prohibited by their state’s Tort Reform 
Act or applicable law from being required to insure vendors.138 This may 
prevent coverage in the event of a third party breach, but it provides a further 
means of protection when the university is limited in its ability to accept an 
indemnification agreement. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, contracting with public institutions of higher learning 
is unlike contracting with private individuals. As arms of the state institutions 
of higher learning are afforded sovereign rights and protections which 
include state sovereign immunity, nullum tempus and anti-deficiency 
limitations. While these sovereign protections and rights effectively hamper 
the state from undertaking certain actions on the one hand, they can 
effectively enable courts to invalidate contracts in favor of the state on the 
other. The risk of a lawsuit in many cases may be unlikely. However, 
contracts with public universities have the potential to be extremely lucrative. 
The monetary advantages that come with such an agreement comes with the 
possibility of higher costs of litigation as a result. Vendors and their counsels 
therefore should look to reassess their indemnification provisions in 
procurement contracts with public institutions of higher learning. Vigilant 
counsels may be able to reduce contractual risk by combining narrowly 
tailored indemnification provisions with liability insurance. Alternatively, 
the use of an agent-principal relationship and/or liability insurance may 
provide some protections in contracts with laws and circumstances that 
weigh heavily against a vendor being indemnified by an institution of higher 
learning. 
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